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SUMMARY
The country has gone digital.' In fact, the wide-spread adoption of
digital technology has actually promoted the convergence 2 of
* Rod Dixon (B.A. 1984, University of Pittsburgh; M.A. 1986, University of Pitts-
burgh; J.D. 1992 George Washington University Law School) is an attorney at the U.S.
Department of Education. He is currently pursuing an LL.M. degree in Labor Law at
Georgetown University Law School. The author wishes to thank Richard Alan Gordon,
Alumni Professor of Entertainment and New Media Law, Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter, for his thoughtful words of encouragement and support.
1. With the Federal government's adoption of digital television in 1998, all media in
American homes will behave essentially like computers controlled by digital signals which
process bits and bytes in television sets, personal computers, video game machines, and
audio recording devices. See Brett Anderson, Television and Your PC: A Winning Combina-
tion, DIGITAL Hoam ENTERTAINMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1997 at 8. Indeed, digital technology can
be used to efficiently express vastly different forms of information-such as factual data-
bases, audio recordings, video entertainment, or electronic newspapers-on a desktop
computer or across the Internet using bits of data in the form of computer Os and ls. Bits (or
Binary digits) are essentially the smallest and most fundamental units of digital technology
data; each bit has a value of 0 or 1. The bits 0 and 1 represent off and on switches which
measure the presence or absence of electrical voltage in any given memory register of the
computer. Since binary bits enable fairly easy digital expression and digital technology sig-
nificantly expands the amount of data that can be processed on a silicon chip, digital format
has become the format of choice in electronics. See, e.g., Peter Norton, INSIDE THE P.C. at
319-320 (6th ed. 1995); Sony Media and Energ3y--Digital Future, (visited April 11, 1998)
<http:lwvw.seI.sony.comSEL/rmeg/digitalfuture/>.
2. "Convergence refers to the interoperation and blending of different electronic me-
dia." See Brett Anderson, Television and Your PC: A Winning Combination, DIGITAL HolME
ENTERTAINMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1997 at 8, 10. One example in consumer devices is the digital
wireless telephone. Genuine digital wireless telephones are not just for sending and receiving
calls. These phones are actually computers that can access the Internet, send and receive
electronic mall, download sports scores in real time, and transmit faxes. See Techno Life,
U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 1, 1997, at 68.
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information technology and interactive entertainment media.3 Internet
web sites, online services, audio music recordings, digital television,
digital motion movie pictures, and electronic mail are all results of the
4
convergence of digital technology. High quality, low cost, and efficient
digital format have given internet users, content providers, and even the
typical electronics product consumer the ability to create, edit, view,
and communicate information unlike ever before.
It is remarkable how fast recent trends have driven an increasing
number of publishers of magazines, newspapers, and other similar
works to port the print version of their works to digital and electronic
format in the form of online computer databases and multimedia CD-
ROM technologies. 6 Online computer databases and CD-ROM media
can be exceptionally profitable ventures for publishers who convert a
preexisting print work into a digital product.7 However, publishers'
3. One expression of this digital convergence can be seen in the many major broadcast
and cable television news operations which, along with major newspapers and magazines,
have moved into Cyberspace with a digital version of their own product. See Micheal Cast-
ner and Michael Toscano, On-Air, Online: TV Puts the Net in NetIvork News, DIGITAL HOME
ENTERTAINMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1997 at 55, 55-56; see also MSNBC (visited April 11, 1998)
<http://www.msnbc.com>; ABC.com The Official ABC TV Website (visited April 11, 1998)
<http://www.abc.com>; CBS (visited April 11, 1998) <http://www.cbs.com>.
4. In its advertising, Sony Corp. coined the phrase "Digital Dream Kids" to describe its
own corporate culture which is taking advantage of the company's entertainment (CBS Rec-
ords is now called Sony Music and Columbia Pictures is now called Sony Pictures) and
consumer electronics businesses (Sony's television, stereo, computers, digital camera
equipment, CDs, and many other consumer electronic products) to market its products in the
21st century. See Sony Says It's Weighing Digital Moves, WALL STREET JoURNAL, Nov. 21,
1997, at B9. Similarly, Microsoft Corporation has positioned its software business to take
advantage of digital convergence through its recent $1 billion investment in Comcast Cable
Television and its $425 million purchase of WebTV, an Internet-based television technol-
ogy. See Randall E. Stross, Mr. Gates Builds His Brain Trust, FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 1997, at 84.
5. See, e.g., Seeing Digital, P.C. MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 1997, at 200; Techno Life, U.s.
NEws & WORLD RmORT, Dec. 1, 1997, at 71 (the online festival D.FILM showcases digi-
tally produced films by amateurs).
6. The Internet is a global network that may be comprised of as many as 4 million host
computers linking approximately 35 million people in over 140 countries. Not only is the
number of computer users accessing the Internet large and growing larger, but the Internet
itself is becoming larger. Almost anyone with the proper software and computer can connect
their hardware to the Internbt and become a part of the Infrastructure of Cyberspace. See
generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 833-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Currently, only about
19 percent of American households are connected to Cyberspace, but just as radio, televi-
sion, and cable each became a mass medium over time, so too will the Internet. Yet unlike
radio of the 1920s, television of the 1950s, or cable of the 1970s, the Internet's growth is
expected to penetrate so deeply into the personal lives of most Americans that the very exis-
tence of the technology will alter how people conduct common everyday tasks.
7. See Making The Web Pay, U.s. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 1, 1997, at 75. Ac-
cording to at least one report, nearly a third of commercial web sites today are profitable. See
id. at 86. Some of these ventures also have been unmistakably unprofitable. Time Warner
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profits from digital media may be impaired if there is a question as to
whether the publisher has satisfactorily secured the copyright to the
material making up the digital media. Often, copyright issues in the
context of new technologies present parties with novel questions that
have uncertain answers. This is due to the development of new tech-
nologies outpacing the ability of copyright law to formulate coherent
doctrines on important issues such as what is copyrightable, what con-
stitutes copyright infringement, and who owns the copyright in what has
been developed.8 This is particularly troublesome in Cyberspace,9 where
digital transmission of media content has the potential to both evade
enforcement efforts relating to copyright interests and undermine the
very principles upon which copyright laws are based.'0
Copyright law affects relations between producers of content and
the writers, artists, computer programmers, and others who actually cre-
ate the content or works upon which entertainment products, computer
databases and web sites are based. This has been made evident by a re-
cent Federal district court decision in New York: Tasini v. New York
Times." The Tasini decision is actually limited to a narrow range of
facts, but the issues that arise from Tasini are as broad as Cyberspace.
Tasini, if upheld, would have the detrimental effect of curtailing devel-
opment of content on web sites, which rely upon articles, graphic
images, photos, and other creative works developed by freelancers off-
line who would have no incentive to cooperatively permit the publica-
tion of their works online or in Cyberspace; in fact, Tasini has *already
Inc. is reported to have lost over $20 million in the last two years that it has operated its
news web site at http://www.pathfinder.com. See Micheal Castner and Michael Toscano, On-
Air, Online: TV Puts the Net in Network News, DIGITAL Hom ENTERTAINMENT, Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 55,58. The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, has created an entirely new reve-
nue source simply by putting its print editions on the World Wide Web.
8. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that in a suit for copyright infringement, the plaintiff must establish its ownership of
a valid copyright, and prove that the defendant copied the copyrighted work). In this case,
the court had to decide what non-literal elements of computer programs were eligible for
copyright protection and whether the elements copied by the defendant were protected by the
scene a faire doctrine.
9. Many web sites owned or operated by major publications, like The New York Times,
are not simply digital versions of a print publication, which provide computer users with
information to view on the computer screen. These web sites allow computer users to inter-
act with the web site by accessing information based on search terms, queries, categories, or
topical hypertext links; these web sites are dynamic, interactive, computer databases. See,
e.g., The New York Times on the Web (visited April 1, 1998) <http://www.nytimes.com>.
10. A great deal has been written about copyright infringement by users of Cyberspace,
but not nearly as much focus has been given to the issues concerning copyright infringement
by the producers of electronic commerce and content.
11. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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caused significant opposition to such. 2 More important, print publica-
tions such as traditional newspapers and magazines who unwittingly
rely upon Tasini to force freelance writers into unfavorable contracts
risk pushing an increasing number of valuable talent into the com-
puter-distributed news business-a business which not only exalts
utilitarian journalism over traditional news stories, but which also is
predicted to take advantage of the cultural shift being created by digital
media by amassing complete control over news delivery and dislocating
most revenue streams for print newspapers and news weeklies.1
4
Tasini was wrongly decided. Tasini made implicit assumptions
about the nature of Lexis-Nexis computer databases and CD-ROM
products that were not warranted or supported by the court's findings.
The contents of a CD-ROM product or an online database must be ac-
cessed by use of program code. Yet, the court never addressed why the
fact that these works contained presumably hundreds, if not thousands,
of lines of code which do not appear in the printed version of the col-
lective work is insignificant to the determination that the digital
products are only revisions of their printed precursors. This fundamental
flaw in the court's analysis should render the decision of little applica-
tion to similar questions in Cyberspace.
In addition, the court's reliance on selection and arrangement fac-
tors, commonly used to analyze the copyright status of factual
compilations, was ill-chosen for a case where, as in Tasini, the compila-
tion is claimed to be a revised collective work and the compilation
exists in a format that renders its selection or arrangement insignificant
to the user of the work. More important, the principles supported by the
decision are wrong-headed and, if adopted by other courts, could have a
devastating impact upon the future development of digital content.
12. As a result of the growing demand for digital content, copyright owners are in a race
to try and get Congress to pass laws that benefit one group over another. See, e.g., David
Landis, Catching Some Entertainment, in Bits and Pieces, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at 8D
(quoting Jay Berman, President of the Recording Industry Association of America).
13. Utilitarian journalism is aimed at helping people make life-style decisions about
goods and services through the use of interactive media. This type of new media equates
news and information and will deliver it on demand to any wired community. In this para-
digm, shopping tips, stock advice, movie reviews and travel ideas are just as important to the
consumer as updates on political stories, crime reports and investigative journalism. See Will
Gates Crush Newspapers, COLUMBIA JoURNALISmM REvmw, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 28.
14. See id. This is more than a prediction about digital convergence; some commenta-
tors believe that software companies and online publications are already hiring writers away
from newspapers and magazine publications in an attempt to marginalize print media.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 1997, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York issued its decision in Tasini v. New York
Times Co.15 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant-publishers, resulting in the dismissal of the plaintiff-freelance
writers' case. 16 The court concluded that publishers are entitled to place
the contents of their periodicals into electronic databases and CD-ROMs
without first securing the permission of the freelance writers whose
contributions are included in those periodicals. 7 The court rejected the
freelance writers' argument that this practice infringes the copyright
each writer holds in his or her individual articles.'8 Instead, the court
found the copying of the freelance writers' works by the publishers
protected under the "revision" privilege of the "collective works" provi-
sion of the Copyright Act of 1976.19 Thus, the court held that the
publishers had not improperly exploited the writers' individual contri-
butions but had permissibly reproduced the articles as part of electronic
or digital revisions of the print versions of newspapers and magazines in
which those articles first appeared.20
The plaintiffs in Tasini were six freelance writers who had sold arti-
cles for publication in The New York Times, Newsday, and Sports
Illustrated from 1991 to 1993. The New York Times and Newsday are
daily newspapers widely circulated to subscribers and newsstands.
Sports Illustrated, published by Time, Inc. (Time), is a weekly maga-
zine featuring articles and commentary of particular interest to sports
enthusiasts. In addition to circulating hard copy or print versions of their
periodicals, the defendant-publishers sell the contents of their publica-
tions to University Microfilms Inc. (now called UMI Company (UMI))
15. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
16. See id. In October 1997, the plaintiffs filed an appeal of the district court's decision
with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
17. See id. at 804.
18. See id. at 806.
19. See id. at 815-16. See also 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
20. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 816. The New York Times has recently adopted a policy
pursuant to which the paper accepts articles by freelance writers only on the express written
condition that the author surrender all rights in his or her creation. See id. at 807, n. 2.
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and The MEAD Corporation (now called Lexis-Nexis (MEAD))2' for
inclusion in assorted electronic data bases. 22
UMI produced and distributed two CD-ROM products that were
pertinent to the Tasini case. One of these products, identified as "The
New York Times OnDisc," was made up of the articles appearing in
each issue of The New York Times. The other CD-ROM product, identi-
fied as "General Periodicals OnDisc," provided image-based
reproductions of The New York Times Book Review and Sunday Maga-
zine.2
The publishers provide Lexis-Nexis with a complete copy of com-
puter files which the publishers use during the process of producing the
hard copy versions of their periodicals. Coded instructions as to page
layout added to these files permit typesetters working for the publishers
to produce an electronic copy of the print articles which resembles the
print publication. Lexis-Nexis does not copy things such as photographs
or advertisements, and the column format of the newspapers is also dis-
regarded. Lexis-Nexis instead uses the electronic files to input the
contents of each article on-line along with such information as the
author's name and the publication and page in which each article ap-
peared. The articles appearing in The New York Times and Newsday are
available soon after they first appear in print, and the articles from an
issue of Sports Illustrated appear on-line within a short time of the ini-
tial hard copy publication.
Computer users access Lexis-Nexis by using a software package, a
network adapter or a modem, and a computer that enables them to ac-
cess Lexis-Nexis' mainframe computers via a dial-up telephone
connection or directly over a private network or the Internet. Once con-
nected, a computer user can enter categories or topics called "libraries."
These libraries consist of the articles from either particular publications
on different general topics or groups of publications. Computer users
can then conduct Boolean searches or other kinds of queries by typing
the desired search terms from which the system generates a number of
21. UMI, a division of Bell & Howell and MEAD, which in December 1994 sold
LEXIS-NEXIS to the Dutch-British conglomerate Reed Elsevier P.L.C., were also named as
defendants.
22. MEAD owns and operates Lexis-Nexis, an on-line database retrieval system which
contains articles and other material from newspapers, newsletters, magazines, journals, court
opinions, legal directories, wire services, and other media sources (including The New York
Times, Newsday, and Sports Illustrated). Articles are displayed or printed in response to
users' search requests.
23. The publishers deliver or electronically transmit to Nexis the full text of all of the
articles appearing in each daily or weekly edition of their periodicals.
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results or hits. These results, consisting of the articles in the database
corresponding to the selected search terms, can be viewed either indi-
vidually or within a citation list. A citation list identifies each article by
the publication in which it appeared, by number of words, and by
author. When a particular article is selected for full-text view, the entire
content of the article appears on screen with a heading providing the
same basic information reported within a citation list. Although articles
are viewed individually, it is possible, albeit unlikely, for a user to find
it useful to enter a search that could generate all of the articles, and only
those articles, appearing in a particular periodical on a particular day.
The plaintiffs contended that these electronic reproductions of their
articles were improper under the Copyright Act and filed a suit for
copyright infringement against the publishers in December 1993.24 Two
of the defendants, Time and Newsday, argued that the plaintiffs had en-
tered into contracts authorizing them to sell the electronic version of the
writers' articles.25 The fulcrum of the publishers' positions, however,
24. The six plaintiffs, Jonathan Tasini, Barbara Garson, David Whitford, Sonia Jaffe
Robbins, Margot Mifflin, and Mary Kay Blakely claim that Defendants infringed their copy-
rights in a total of 21 articles sold for publication between 1990 and 1993. All of the
plaintiffs wrote their articles on a freelance basis and not as employees of the defendant
publishers. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806.
25. As of the time the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, freelance assignments for The New
York Times were typically undertaken pursuant to verbal agreements reached between the
newspaper and the contributing journalists. These discussions seldom extended into negotia-
tions over rights in the commissioned articles. Indeed, there were no such negotiations
between The New York Times and any of the plaintiffs, all of whom submitted their articles
for publication by The New York Times without any written agreements. Newsday solicited
its freelance contributions in much the same manner as did The New York Times and without
any written agreements. However, the checks with which Newsday paid freelance writers for
their contributions, including those checks sent to plaintiffs following the publication of their
articles, included an endorsement which read: "Signature required. Check void if this en-
dorsement altered. This check accepted as full payment for first-time publication rights (or
all rights, if agreement is for all rights) to material described on face of check in all editions
published by Newsday and for the right to include such material in electronic library ar-
chives."
Tasini crossed out this notation prior to cashing those checks paying him for his two
disputed submissions to Newsday. Those plaintiffs who wrote the remaining six Newsday
articles cashed their checks with the notation intact.
Whitford submitted an article for publication in Sports Illustrated. Whitford and Sports
Illustrated entered into a written contract specifying the content and length of the purchased
article, the date due, and the fee to be paid by the magazine. The contract also gave Sports
Illustrated the following rights:
(a) the exclusive right first to publish the Story in the Magazine:
(b) the non-exclusive right to license the republication of the Story whether
in translation,digest, or abridgment form or otherwise in other publica-
tions, provided that the Magazine shall pay to you fifty percent (50%) of
all net proceeds it receives for such republication: and
1997-1998]
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rested on the argument that, even in the absence of such agreements, the
publishers properly exercised their right under the Copyright Act to
produce revised versions of their collective works. 26 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the selection was not preserved by the publishers in
developing the electronic products because the databases allow access
to individual articles, regardless of whether the whole work is contained
in the database. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the articles are
stored in the database without relation to any other articles that the ini-
tial compilation may have contained, and the database is combined with
thousands of other articles from other printed publications.27 In other
words, the publishers did not revise the collective work, but instead cre-
ated another original work and hence copied the freelance writers'
works without authorization.
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is dis-
tinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially
in the author of the contribution.28 In Tasini, there was no dispute as to
whether the freelance writers had retained this copyright; they had. Ac-
cordingly, the publishers, as owners of copyright in the collective work
only, had acquired the privilege of reproducing and distributing the
contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of
that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.
The court had no difficulty in making these determinations since the
publishers never contended that they had permissibly created an original
29
collective work. What is not clear, at least as the parties viewed the
facts in Tasini, is whether an author's works may be copied, after initial
publication as a printed collective work, onto a web page on the inter-
net, into a computer database, or onto a CD-ROM product, as a revised
collective work, for retrieval by the general public without prior permis-
sion and without infringing the author's copyright.
(c) the right to republish the Story or any portions thereof in or in connection
with the Magazine or in other publications published by The Time Inc.
Magazine Company, its parent, subsidiaries or affiliates, provided that
you shall be paid the then prevailing rates of the publication in which the
Story is republished.
See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 807.
26. See id. at 806.
27. See id. at 821.
28. See 17. U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
29. Neither the court nor the parties found it particularly relevant that the magazine and
newspaper publishers had not revised the collective works on Lexis-Nexis themselves. The
relevant revision rights had been assigned to the corporate owner of Lexis-Nexis and, there-
fore, that company was named as a defendant in the case.
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The freelance writers, however, took the argument further and
maintained that the publishers had actually exceeded their narrow
privileges of copyright by producing the freelance writers' works as part
of a new collective work in the form of a computer database on Lexis-
Nexis and as part of various CD-ROM products. In other words, the
freelance writers argued that the digital formats of these "new" collec-
tive works do not revise the publishers' printed version collective
works, but instead exploit the freelance writers' works without permis-
sion and without compensation.
The court took a different view. In refuting the plaintiffs argu-
ments, the court noted that, but for the editors' selection of the articles
for the initial print compilations, they would not have been included in
the databases at all; thus, the selection is in fact preserved. 3' Further-
more, the selection is preserved because an article pulled from the
database still retains a reference to the initial periodical the article ap-
peared in and the article's location in that periodical. The court also
thought it particularly relevant that the databases also allow users to re-
tain the ability to search for articles that appeared in only one
publication, thus removing the issue of the intermingling of articles
from different publications.32
The court's analysis implicitly favors the protection of substantially
revised collective works over the need to carefully assess whether
impermissible copying of an original work results from the creation of a
new work. Once the court cloaks the digital works within the protective
safe-harbor of a "revised collective work," it undertakes little further
assessment of the proper scope of a revised work. Its work is done; the
defendants' copying of the plaintiffs' works is protected. This lack of
assessment by the court is detrimental in its unfair balancing of the
publishers' interests against those of the authors. Taken in the worst
light, the court's opinion could grant publishers a free pass to create an
entirely new collective work out of the works of others for whom the
publishers need not pay.33 Had the court determined that the electronic
30. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809.
31. See id. at 823.
32. See id. at 823-25.
33. Although it can be argued that publishers, without the armor provided by Tasini,
could force freelance writers to negotiate away their electronic rights at the same time an
agreement is signed concerning the initial grant of copyrights, that argument misses the point
of Tasini. Tasini essentially takes away the bargaining rights of freelance writers by finding
that publishers are free to substantially revise their collective works without fear of copyright
infringement. In other words, Tasini leaves the freelance author with essentially nothing left
to bargain over concerning electronic rights in a collective work.
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versions of the collective works amounted to original works, or
undertaken cautious analysis of what the proper scope of revision rights
in a collective work should be under the facts of Tasini, the underlying
principle that copyright law is first and foremost meant to protect
original works could have been sustained.
After Tasini, freelance authors may be lawfully uncompensated by
the publishers of digital content who revise the collective work con-
taining the freelance author's original creation. The result of the district
court's decision is to extend revision rights far beyond its permissible
bounds. Properly viewed, Tasini does not involve the revision right of a
publisher of a printed collective work who revises that work and thereby
produces a copyright-protected computer database. 34 Rather, it involves
the application of an author's copyright in the electronic version of a
work that was clearly protectable when it was in non-digital form. In
this respect, Tasini's failure to find copyright infringement in the pub-
lishers' production of an online database using an author's original
works constitutes a misapplication of the law of copyright.
Under the law of copyright, copyright ownership of a work is pre-
sumed to vest in its author, who is the person who translates an idea into
a fixed and tangible expression. This rule is axiomatic unless one can
establish by a clear writing, signed by the parties, that the actual author
intended to transfer her authorship rights. Another elementary principle
of copyright law provides that one has only the rights to use a work that
he or she acquires from the copyright holder or that are otherwise pro-
vided by the provisions of the Copyright Act. In this respect, generally,
if an author permits her publisher to publish her work and grants the
publisher a license for the print rights to that work, the publisher, on the
basis of this limited license, would not be able to lawfully copy the
same work as part of an on-line database, a web site in Cyberspace, or
some other electronic media such as a CD-ROM; that part of the law is
clear.
34. The issues raised by this case have confounded other courts as well. In both Brod-
erbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) and Digital
Comm. Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987), district courts
made a similar analytical mistake as the district court did here.
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I. CONVEYANCES OF NEW TECHNOLOGY RIGHTS
Before examining what rights have been granted, it is necessary to
35look at the types of conveyances granting rights. If there is an
assignment of all rights, there often is no issue.36 The owner of the
copyright has conveyed everything he had and retains nothing; the right
to use the work existing in digital format belongs to the grantee. The
significant problem arises when the grantor conveys less than the whole,
or at least contends that he did so, and it becomes necessary to
determine what was granted and what was actually retained.37
When dealing with less than the whole bundle of rights in copyright,
the copyright holder often relies on some type of instrument of convey-
ance.3  The conveyance centers upon exactly what rights have been
granted and specifically enumerated in the license or instrument of con-
veyance. The grant is limited to precisely those rights. What is not
enumerated is not granted. 9 In one common form of conveyance, the
copyright is assigned with a reservation of rights to the author or gran-
tor. What has not been explicitly reserved is deemed granted. A single
instrument or contract could make use of both types of conveyances
35. The law of contracts often is the backdrop for resolving disputes over new uses of
copyrighted material. This is due to the fact that copyright owners, such as freelance writers,
often grant publishers or other third parties use of their work by means of a license or con-
tract which governs the use of the work and the scope of the rights being granted. However,
as was true in Tasini, courts rely on copyright law and principles when contracts or licenses
fail to elucidate the parties intent. See Bert J. Miano, Intellectual Property-Copyright Li-
censing Agreements: In Contemplation of Future Technology, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 485
(1995).
36. This statement is a slight oversimplification of the issue, particularly when the par-
ties dispute whether the grant, regardless of its form, duly contemplated the use of the work
in a particular new technology. In cases involving new technologies like the Internet or cer-
tain forms of digital media like CD-ROMs or DVDs (digital video/versatile discs), a central
issue often concerns whether the parties could have mutually contemplated the future devel-
opment of the new technology, despite the grantor's grant of all rights to the grantee.
37. Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, a distinction was made between a partial and
total assignment of copyright. The Copyright Act of 1909 viewed copyright as indivisible
and did not recognize partial assignments. A partial assignment was considered a license
which did not carry the same legal rights as an assignment of copyright. For all practical
purposes, the 1976 Act officially terminated this distinction. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPY-
RIGHT § 4.4.1.2 (1989); 3 MELVILLE B. NiMEfR & DAVID NMMER, NmMEmR ON COPYRIGHT
10.02, at 10-22 to 10-35 (1997).
38. See M. WILLIAM KRAsILovsKY AND SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MusIc, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY FOR PUBLISHERS, WRITERS, RECORD COMPANIES,
PRODUCERS, ARTISTS, AND AGENTS at 144 (7th ed. 1995).
39. See id. at 144-45. See also Jonathan L. Kirsch, "Lonesome Dove" and the Elec-
tronic Rights Revolution in Book Publishing, Los ANGELES LAWYER, April 1990, at 26.
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spelling out what has been granted and what has been reserved. 40 Con-
sequently, when a new technology is developed and that technology
creates a new medium for copying a pre-existing work, the issue in Ta-
sini arises; namely, when a right has been granted to exploit a
copyrighted work, and a new use is then discovered for the work, who
has the right to exploit the new use-the grantor or the grantee? Does
the new use fall within the reserved rights or the granted rights?
The issue can be further complicated or, in some cases, simplified
by the existence of a "future technology clause." This is a clause in the
contract granting the licensee the right to exploit the work in "all media
now known or hereafter conceived or created." The complication arises
when the judge or lawyer seeks to interpret the very language of the
grant and determine to what the future technology clause extends. An all
encompassing grant in one provision might be limited either by the
context in which it appears, by other provisions in the same contracts, or
by other subsequent related contracts. The outcome will depend on how
narrow or broad a reading is given to the actual words of the grant.
Although the Tasini court had little trouble finding that the publish-
ers had only limited rights in the articles they had published,4' the court
was, nonetheless, convinced that those limited rights were extensive
enough so that the publishers had not improperly exploited the works of
the authors by publishing the electronic versions of the printed works.
The court held that the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976
supports its finding that the allowance of "revisions" to a collective
work should be read broadly, only limited by a simple inquiry into
whether the collective work is still a recognizable version of the initial
collective work so as to still be considered only a revision. This limited
inquiry by the court in Tasini resulted in the publishers prevailing over
the authors.42
40. See KRASILOVSKY AND SH MEL, supra note 38, at 145.
41. The publishers had only the initial rights and any subsequent rights that applied to
the publishers' collective work or compilation. A collective work is one composed of a num-
ber of elements, often separate works unto themselves, that are collected and arranged into a
compilation. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Thus, an anthology of stories or a magazine con-
sisting of articles and pictures is a collective work.
Under the Copyright Act, the selection and arrangement of the elements that form the
collective work or compilation constitute the compiler's protectable collective work. The
author of the compilation does not generally have any rights in the individual elements be-
yond the right to use them in the collective work. The author of the collective work can use
the component works as part of the collective work or as part of subsequent revisions of the
collective work. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
42. To evaluate this, the court found that it is necessary to determine what aspects of a
collective work constitute the defining elements that need to be preserved and held That the
defining element of a collective work is the selection of elements that constitute the compi-
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Although Tasini's holding is ostensibly limited to non-fiction essays
published as part of a collective work, its application, if upheld, will be
far beyond its facts. The court's departure from the basic principles of
copyright law is not significant merely because it may have cut a new
swath of law from precedents that were poorly stitched together to begin
with, but Tasini is also significant because, if allowed to stand as the
law of copyright, it will have an extraordinary effect on Cyberspace and
multimedia entertainment. On-line databases, multimedia technologies
and online entertainment-based interactive software applications are
proliferating. Often, these new digital products contain works that were
formerly part of another collective work in print form or some form
other than electronic.
In Cyberspace, the works of many authors can be found on web
sites owned or operated by publishers of print media who neither ob-
tained permission nor compensated the authors for use of the works.
More interesting, vast databases exist in Cyberspace in the form of so-
called indexes and "search-engines," which catalog and record the loca-
tion of the contents of almost every web page. One novel question with
regard to these types of databases concerns whether these large data-
bases improperly exploit the works of others through the manner in
which the search-engine copies or reproduces the contents of other web
pages without explicit permission from the web page author.43
Notably, the Tasini court recognized that the effect of its holding
essentially divested valuable copyright ownership from the creator of
the work and posited that value fully with the electronic publisher. This
ruling, consequently, could affect the intellectual property rights of a
large number of other creators of original works whose works, after ini-
tial publication, subsequently appear on the Internet as part of an E-zine,
an online searchable index, a web site-computer database, a virtual gal-
lery or museum in Cyberspace, or some other form of multimedia-
entertainment or CD-ROM product.
What follows is an examination of whether, when analyzed against
the complex backdrop of the dual purposes of granting an author exclu-
sive and beneficial copyright protection, the Tasini decision is a
lation. Tasini holds that the electronic works at issue all preserve this selection, as all of the
electronic products contain the articles selected by the publisher.
43. It is clear that these search engines are copying at least some of the contents of each
web page the search engine visits. What is not clear, as a factual matter, is how much of the
web page is copied. Nor is the legal question well settled concerning whether the hypertext
link produced by the database results in an unlawful copy. See, e.g., HotBot (visited April
11, 1998) <http://www.hotbot.com> and AltaVista Technology, Inc. (visited April 1I, 1998)
<http://www.altavista.com>.
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satisfying one; this paper will show that it is not. Often, when copyright
infringement is alleged, courts must balance the constitutionally com-
peting aims of promoting human creativity and original expression
through strict enforcement of the copyright law with ensuring that broad
copyright protections do not unfairly or unnecessarily prevent the de-
velopment of our knowledge base-particularly, the nation's
development of practical uses of technology and information. This kind
of balancing, however, does not seem evident in the court's analysis in
Tasini. The court, ostensibly, balanced the interests of parties each as-
serting copyright interests, none of whom explicitly favored relaxed
copyright enforcement for the sake of the development of knowledge.
Nonetheless, this tension still existed in Tasini. It is usually assumed
that by failing to protect the copyright interests of authors, courts may
almost implacably erode the interests of authors in creating original
works. In this respect, the Tasini court may have balanced the rights of
publishers so favorably as to have unwittingly subverted the constitu-
tional aim of copyright law-to promote human creativity and original
expression.
11. THE SCOPE OF A REVISED COLLECTIVE WORK
The Tasini court had to address the difficult issue of determining the
upper limits for revising a preexisting collective work. The Copyright
Act contained no answer and no case law had ever addressed this nar-
row question. The court needed to assess whether the principles
underlying the Copyright Act supported the view that a digital collective
work (in the form of an online database or CD-ROM) was so substan-
tially different from a printed collective work (in the form of a
newspaper or magazine) that the digital work could not be deemed a
mere revision, but instead constituted an original work that infringed the
rights of individual authors. With this task in sight, the court erred by
borrowing the "selection and arrangement" doctrine, developed to set
the limits of permissible revising and assess whether a factual compila-
tion had the requisite originality to warrant copyright protection.
The Tasini court had to grapple with the question of whether the
publishers, themselves, had created an original work." But, under the
44. Under Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, the authors of collective works may
permissibly revise those works without infringing the copyright held by authors of the indi-
vidual works that make up the collective work. To create an infringing copy, the author of
the collective work would have to alter the collective work so substantially as to make it
plain that a new collective work had been created (instead of a preexisting one being re-
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pertinent copyright analysis, the court had to find that the collective
work was not original in order to conclude that the electronic versions
of the initial collective works were revisions for which copyright pro-
tection could be provided to the publishers. In other words, the court's
analysis ultimately promotes the production of substantially revised
collective works to the detriment of the author's works on which the so-
called revised collective works are based.
The initial inquiry before the court was whether the application of
revision rights to a pre-existing compilation altered by the combination
of statements or instructions of a computer program is proper under
copyright doctrine. Two erroneous assumptions underlie the argument
that the publisher-defendants in Tasini had the right to use or create an
independently-written computer program that produced, in electronic
form, the same compilation that appeared in their print publications.
First, the court implicitly drew an artificial and improper distinction
between the computer program that runs the database and what the pro-
gram, along with the data, produces when actually used by a database
user. In addition, the court failed to recognize that an on-line computer
database that is continuously updated, such as the Lexis-Nexis database,
should not be analyzed in accordance with its selection and arrangement
of data elements when much of the selection and arrangement of data
elements is subject to change as the database expands or contracts. The
district court erred in its analysis of the online computer database in Ta-
sini because it failed to consider the database in its entirety. This failure
caused the court to draw conclusions that were both technologically in-
correct and logically unfounded.
The court's opinion extended revision rights to the CD-ROM prod-
ucts and the online computer database as compilations or collective
works. The court, without explanation, also drew an improper distinc-
tion between the apparent structure of the elements or data in the
database and the computer program used to run the database.45 The
court's analysis demonstrates that it evaluated whether the CD-ROM
vised). In other words, The New York Times may permissibly revise any newspaper edition
and publish that revised edition without having to obtain copyright permission from the
authors of any freelance pieces that appear in any given newspaper. For example, Section
201(c) permits The New York Times to republish its papers as part of a book. This, undoubt-
edly, would constitute a "revision" of collective works published by the newspaper.
45. Computer programs, at least in object-code form, are technological in nature. Data-
base software, which is usually intended to serve utilitarian purposes, defies easy
categorization under copyright doctrine that was initially intended to apply other forms of
intellectual property. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Pro-
grams, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106
HItAv. L. REv. 977 (1993).
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products and the online database were revisions of printed works by
focusing solely on the content or elements of the collective works.
While such surgical precision may be justified in instances where the
court must determine who had which copyright, the issue before the
court in Tasini neither required nor warranted the court's unusual ap-
proach. Indeed, after recognizing that the issue before it, in part, was to
determine whether the new technological format of the products (i.e. the
printed collective works or newspapers and magazines now in -digital
format) constituted a revised product or an original product, the court
never reached this issue in its analysis.
Instead, the court started its analysis with the faulty assumption that
the digital product included little more than digitized text that could be
viewed on a computer screen. The court did not consider what weight
should be given to the fact that the so-called revised products contain
thousands of lines of computer code that must be executed on the ma-
chine that contains the online database or CD-ROM product.46 Nor did
the court evaluate the contents of the Nexis database other than to find
the selection and arrangement of the print articles still intact.47 The court
also never explicitly acknowledged the fact that the online database on
Nexis contains thousands of articles never selected by the publishers of
The New York Times or N'ewsday, nor how this fact alone could render
the selection and arrangement criteria inapposite to a database case of
the sort before the court. In these respects, the Tasini court failed to ad-
here to the doctrines reflected in the Copyright Act and case law
interpreting it.
Under the United States Copyright Act, a computer program is a set
of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.48 Unless the certain result effected
by a program is independently protected under copyright law, anyone
46. It goes without saying that the CD-ROM products contain less program code than
the Lexis-Nexis database. Nonetheless, the contents of a CD-ROM product must be accessed
by use of program code. The court never decided why this is insignificant in its determina-
tion that the digital products are only revisions of their printed precursors.
47. This finding is of no obvious import in regard to the Lexis-Nexis database since that
database contains thousands of articles neither selected nor arranged in any manner relating
to the print versions of the publications at issue. The CD-ROM products more closely re-
semble their printed precursors, but the question remains why selection and arrangement is
relevant to the determination before the court regarding a revised compilation that exists in
digital format, Why should the court care about this in its analysis? It is not readily apparent
other than to say it is easy to borrow doctrine that was formulated for another context.
48. See Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 6 IGH TECH L.J. 209, app. at
264-69 (1991).
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has the right to produce independent code bringing about an identical
result. In fact, to the extent that a specific piece of code is the only way
to bring about some aspect of this certain result, one of only a few prac-
tical ways of doing so, or an obvious or standard way of doing so from
the point of view of an experienced programmer, that specific piece of
code is not protected.4 9 A court would therefore be mistaken to simply
assume that the database code in Tasini was protectable code owned by
someone other than the publishers, and to ignore, for the purpose of
analysis, the computer code that existed as part of the computer data-
base. 5 The copyrightability of aspects of the computer database code
should have no place in deciding whether the computer database is a
revised version of a printed collective work .
It is widely recognized, and not questioned in the Tasini case, that
different computer programs can generate identical outputs. Therefore,
even the identity of unprotected output does not establish infringement
of the underlying program. As for computer databases, a database is
created as a result of the use of [1] computer hardware, [2] software, [3]
52
compilation code, and [4] data or content. The interaction of these four
elements ostensibly constitutes a useable computer database.
53
In perhaps its purest form, the entire digitized database is nothing
more than machine language, binary zeros and ones, which act as
electronic on/off switches. These switches ultimately respond to
computer instructions that implement an algorithm defining how the
software program should translate user queries and display the results.
The data contained in the database could be factual material such as
49. See id.
50. Lexis-Nexis may have owned any existing copyright interest in the online computer
database. The court may have found this relevant to its analysis, but it did not explicitly say
SO.
51. The scene a faire doctrine denies protection to program elements that are dictated
by external factors such as "the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a par-
ticular program is intended to run" or "widely accepted programming practices within the
computer industry." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-710 (2d
Cir. 1992).
52. The output is then displayed as content on a computer screen. Every time an
:image" or "copy" of a work is shown on a computer screen, the work is displayed.
"'[D]isplay' would include the... showing of an image on a cathode ray tube, or similar
viewing apparatus connected with any sort of information storage and retrieval system."
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976). In the narrow context of a digital version of a collec-
tive work, it may be a trivial matter whether copyright infringement is based on
impermissible display or reproduction since ultimately electronic copies cannot be perceived
without the aid of a machine.
53. The database can be "captured" on a CD-ROM or other similar media, or the data-
base can exit "live" in an online format that can be updated continuously with the addition of
new data or the deletion of old data.
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airline reservations or social security numbers, or the data could be a
great deal more elaborate and contain tables of records of text files that
essentially serve as digital copies of articles that initially appeared in a
newspaper, book, or magazine.
The conclusion that what a program does, and therefore its appear-
ance to the outside world when viewed solely through input and output
devices, is not protected by the copyright in the program comports with
well over 100 years of copyright case law. The scope of such protection
is circumscribed by all of copyright's traditional limiting doctrines and
is not affected by the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act which
recognize the protectability of computer programs. Despite the similar
approaches of patent and copyright law, both of which strike. a balance
between providing an incentive for the creation of works and ensuring
that the public and later creators can enjoy and build upon an expanding
public domain, they are distinct components of a coherent scheme of
intellectual property protection.54
Even if a court were to approach the issue of copyright protection
for a computer database by viewing the screen or print output of a query
to a computer database as distinct from the underlying program running
the database-as the Tasini court presumably did-the fundamental
nature of this technology should caution against reliance upon such an
approach. It is clear that what a computer database does when it causes
a computer screen to display an article or some other search result is
inextricably tied to the computer database software program's structure,
database elements, and machine code for purposes of database copyright
analysis. Indeed, the court conceded that the analysis it had adopted
would almost inevitably lead to the same result; namely concluding that
an online database is just a revised copy of a print newspaper or maga-
zine. Unfortunately, the Tasini court overlooked the fact that the basic
technology of a computer database cuts against its finding that the pro-
duction of a computer database is merely a revision of a printed
collective work under copyright law. Perhaps the court made this error
because it mistakenly relied upon an analysis of collective works drawn
from case law regarding factual compilations instead of applying copy-
right doctrine more appropriately drawn from cases involving software
54. Patent law seeks to promote the advancement of technology while copyright law
seeks to encourage culture and the arts. Given their different foci, it is not surprising that
Congress has crafted very different balances in these two areas. In view of the very different
thresholds for as well as the scope and terms of protection, to extend copyright by protecting
the Tasini databases without due protection of the author's electronic works and without
explicit Congressional authorization presents grave challenges to the integrity of the entire
intellectual property law system.
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applications or multimedia video games. Whatever the reason for the
court's unusual detour, the application of case law from factual compi-
lations is a wrong turn for the information superhighway.
Although basic copyright law requires that outputs of computer
programs be evaluated on the basis of their own merits as expressive
works of authorship and not any copyright in the program that produces
them, Tasini provides no basis for determining how such a distinction
should be drawn in the case of revisions to collective works. Does it
matter that a computer database involves the manipulation of data by an
external software program when a court is reviewing whether the col-
lective work so substantially departs from the print version that the
digital format should be considered an original work? This question is
left unanswered by Tasini, yet the answer is pivotal in assessing whether
the revision rights granted by the court are excessive. An inequity seems
to lurk in the idea that a collective work can be altered so dramatically
as to make a product with uses far exceeding its printed counterpart, yet
the alteration is so slight that the elements of the revised collective work
may be used without compensation. This, however, is the proposition
that Tasini stands for.
The court repeatedly referred to the selection and arrangement in
elements it found to be protected:
The General Periodicals On Disc product does maintain the
character of the original work. The disk contains exact images
of the magazine pages. You can see a publication in whole, as
the editors originally envisioned the work. You can see the ad-
vertisements, the pictures, and you can see which articles came
before and after a particular article.55
A Nexis database, however, does not so readily and apparently preserve
the character of the original work, nor is the database used as the origi-
nal publication is used. If a reader views an article located by searching
a Nexis database, the reader is not able to view the article in context as
it originally appeared in print; page numbers become mere citations.
Although the Tasini court held that the selection was maintained based
on how the database was actually used,56 this is often not the case. Most
people do not access Nexis to read the morning paper.
Frequently, multi-periodical databases such as Nexis are searched
for specific topics within a large collection of works and are not used
because of a desire to take advantage of an editor's particular selection
55. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 823-24.
56. Id.
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of articles. The removal of context, coupled with the frequent compila-
tion of multiple periodicals into one database for search purposes and
the different audience for the original and the electronic products,
makes it disingenuous to say that a Nexis database is merely a revision
of The New York Times.
In general, the question of whether and how databases should be
protected by law has never been easy, as it necessarily involves finding
a balance between two potentially conflicting societal goals: the goal of
providing adequate incentives for their continued production and the
goal of ensuring public access to the information they contain. At dif-
ferent points in time, in different societies, that balance has been struck
in different ways. The major landmark among these changes was the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.57 As a result of the explosive growth of the Inter-
net and the rapid developments in the technologies for collecting,
organizing, reproducing, and disseminating information, copyright law
is being viewed more as a tool for the benefit of the public. Since in-
formation wants to be free, as many in Cyberspace believe, copyright
law should strive to make the information contained in protected works
of authorship freely available on the Internet. Of course, this outcome
would not directly serve any of the interests in Tasini. However, if all
computer databases were subject to exceptionally narrow copyright
protection, could this be a way out of Tasini?
In the terminology of copyright law, a database is a "compilation":
"a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materi-
als or of data."5' 8 Compilations constitute one of the oldest forms of
authorship protected under U.S. law, dating back to the eighteenth cen-
tury.f Compilations were protected as "books" under the first federal
copyright statute.6
The earliest compilation cases that discussed the basis for copyright
protection identified the compiler's effort--"his own expense, or skill,
or labor, or money"61-as the critical contribution justifying protec-
tion.62 These cases, involving works ranging from law reports and legal
57. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
59. See, e.g., Kilty v. Green, 4 H. & McH. 345 (Gen. Ct. Md. 1799) (denying relief in
case involving compilation of statutes).
60. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting books, maps,
and charts).
61. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
62. See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Assoc., 144 F. 83 (7th Cir. 1906), af'd, 209
U.S. 20 (1908); West Publ'g Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publ'g Co., 79 F. 756 (2d Cir.
Profits in Cyberspace
encyclopedias to compilations of war records, emphasized both the
compilers' effort and the copiers' "unfair use of the copyrighted work,
in order to save themselves the time and labor of original investiga-
tion."63 Contemporary treatises echoed this approach.64 The evolving
doctrine of originality was applied by some courts in compilation cases,
particularly cases involving compilations of textual materials such as
law books. These cases identified the author's judgment in selecting and
arranging materials as the critical contribution which justified protec-
tion.65 This approach coexisted with, rather than supplanted, sweat of the
brow cases. Sweat of the brow was applied to cases involving purely
factual compilations, such as catalogs and directories. Sometimes the
two approaches appeared to be melded together in a single case, with
the court focusing on the "labor" and "skill" contributed by the author.66
With very few exceptions, courts drew on these approaches to support
the conclusion that a particular compilation was protectable, rather than
to deny protection.
The Supreme Court struck down the "sweat of the brow" doctrine in
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.67 In finding that a
white pages telephone directory lacked copyright-protection, the Court
held that the sole basis for protection under U.S. copyright law is crea-
tive originality."
Rural Telephone Service Co. (Rural), -was a local telephone
company that produced a white-pages telephone directory covering its
1897); West Publ'g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909), modi-
fied, 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910); Egbert v. Greenberg, 100 F. 447 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900); Ladd
v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896); American Trotting Register Ass'n. v. Gocher, 70
F. 237 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895); Hanson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 F. 202 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1887); Chapman v. Ferry, 18 F. 539 (C.C.D. Or. 1883); Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961); Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No.
17, 323); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); Gray v. Rus-
sell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
63. West Publ'g Co., 79 F. at 772.
64. See, e.g., EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 386 (1879); GEORGE T.
CURTIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 174 (1847).
65. See, e.g., Edward Thompson Co. v. American Lawbook Co., 122 F. 922, 924 (2d
Cir. 1903) (focusing on the "skill and taste of the [plaintiff] in selecting or arranging" mate-
rials); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 28 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) ("Copyright
may justly be claimed by an author of a book who has taken existing materials from sources
common to all writers, and arranged and combined them in a new form, and given them an
application unknown before, because skill and discretion were exercised in making the se-
lections, arrangement, and combination, and something new and useful has been achieved.").
66. See, e.g., Hanson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 F. 202,203 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887).
67. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
68. See id. at 351.
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service area." Feist Publications (Feist), the defendant, published a
directory covering multiple service areas. After Feist sought, and was
refused, a license to the listings in Rural's directory, it copied the
listings without authorization. 70 The district court found Feist liable for
infringement]'
In Feist, the Supreme Court held that "[o]riginality is a constitu-
tional requirement. 72 Citing nineteenth-century case law, the Court
derived this requirement from the Constitutional terms "Writings" and
"Authors" in the grant of authority to Congress to enact copyright
laws.73 Subsequent cases have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Feist. In Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enter.
Inc.,74 the Second Circuit sustained the copyrightability of the yellow
pages of a telephone directory for New York's Chinese-American
community. The court found that the selection of entries in Key's di-
rectory was original.75 In addition, the arrangement of the directory into
categories (e.g., Accountants, Bridal Shops, Shoe Stores, Bean Curd &
Bean Sprout Shops) was, when "viewed in the aggregate," original, be-
cause it "entailed the de minimis thought needed to withstand the
originality requirement." 76
In two post-Feist cases, the Eleventh Circuit found that the copying
of significant portions of copyrightable compilations was not
infringement because the material copied did not rise to the level of
creative authorship. In Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publ'g, Inc. ("BAPCO"),n the Eleventh Circuit held that the
defendant's entry into a computer of all of the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of advertisers in the plaintiff's yellow pages
telephone directory, together with business type and type of
advertisement, did not infringe. The court focused on the elements of
selection, coordination and arrangement that the plaintiff claimed were
69. See id. at 342.
70. See id. at 343.
71. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision.
72. Id. at 346.
73. Id. (quoting U.S. CON sT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The Court hinted, however, that other
forms of protection may not be subject to the same constitutional restriction. See id. at 354
("Protection for the fruits of such research... may in certain circumstances be available
under a theory of unfair competition") (quoting Nimmer § 3.04, p. 3-23).
74. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
75. Id. at 513.
76. Id. at 514.
77. 999 F.2d 1436 (1lth Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 1446.
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infringed and found each to be either unprotectable or not copied.79 For
example, the plaintiff claimed (and the district court held) that it
selected the listings by determining the geographic scope of the
directory, establishing a closing date for changes, and limiting listings
to subscribers to its business telephone service, as well as through a
variety of marketing techniques. The court found that these elements did
not meet the level of creativity required by Feist.8 o
Tasini borrowed the Feist analysis on originality and applied it to
the Nexis online database and CD-ROM products to determine whether
the databases at issue were revisions of the print version newspaper and
magazine publications. However, Tasini relied upon the Feist criteria
without first determining whether Feist was really applicable to the
computer databases. In fact, Feist differs from Tasini in many relevant
respects. Feist did not involve a computer database; it involved a printed
version of a telephone directory listing. Nor did Feist involve a collec-
tive work made up of components which, themselves, were
copyrightable. Feist involved a factual compilation wherein the facts, as
its components, were not subject to copyright protection. This is a criti-
cal distinction. The freelance writers' complaint against the publishers
rests on the fact that the elements of the publishers' computer database
were protected by copyright. More importantly, since Feist did not in-
volve a collective work that was a computer database, Tasini's reliance
on Feist's selection and arrangement factors was ill-chosen. These fac-
tors seem to be particularly irrelevant in instances where the
compilation is claimed to be a revised collective work and the compila-
tion exists in a format that renders the selection or arrangement of its
elements insignificant to the user of the work.
mII. FREELANCE WRITING CONTRACT PRACTICES
IN THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY
Historically, freelance writers and publishers have been lax in cre-
ating written, let alone unambiguous, contracts.8 ' Until recently,
79. See id. at 1441-44.
80. See id. at 1441.
81. The contract between the parties may convey the copyright in whatever manner the
parties choose. See ROBERT A. GoRAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 52-53 (1991) (discussing copy-
right assignments and licenses). Section 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides
that "ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of con-
veyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property
by the applicable laws of intestate succession." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1994).
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magazines and newspapers bought articles simply on the basis of oral
agreements, and the freelance contracts that did exist did not expresslyS •82
address the parties' rights in electronic media. Courts must thus decide
whether these agreements convey more than the right for the newspaper
to print the work once."
The interpretation of copyright assignments for content published as
part of a collective work differs somewhat from that of other types of
assignments. Section 201c of the 1976 Act provides:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of
any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective
work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of repro-
ducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any
later collective work in the same series. 84
On its face, the statute suggests that freelance writers and photographers
for magazines and newspapers who did not sign contracts are presumed
to have granted only first North American serial rights, rendering the
discussion moot as to journalists and photographers but not book
authors.85
82. See Don E. Tomlinson & Christopher R. Harris, Free-Lance Photojournalism in a
Digital World: Copyright, Lanham Act & Droit Moral Considerations Plus a Sui Generis
Solution, 45 FED. CoMM. L. J. 1, 23 (1992) (noting that in the photojournalism trade,
"commitments [are] made without written purchase orders [and] obligations are fulfilled on
the basis of a telephone call or handshake") (quoting CLIFrON C. EDOM, PHOTOJOURNALISM
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES at 255 (2d ed. 1980)); Douglas Steinberg, Note, Journalists'
Rights to Their Own Work, 8 ART & L. 113, 120-21 (1983) (discussing the history of oral
contracting in journalism).
83. Freelance contracts for journalists generally gave publishers first North American
serial rights, which granted the publication the exclusive right to publish the piece first. See
Hanna Liebman, National Writers Union Suit Seeks Clarification on Freelancers' Rights,
MEDIAWEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 4 ("At issue are the rights to stories when such are not
spelled out in written contracts.").
84. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1984); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NnamR" & DAVID NIMMER,
NITraER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[B], at 10-85 to 10-94 (1997) (discussing § 201(c) in the
context of licenses).
85. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486,491 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
that changing the medium of a work is in itself insufficient to warrant recognition of a new
copyright); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)
("All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' con-
tributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his
own."' If the later, or electronic, collective work is not separately copyrightable from the
earlier, or printed, compilation, then the electronic compilation should be considered "a
revision" of the printed compilation). Cf L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 491; Secure Servs.
Technology v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(finding that the rearranging of binary digits in a computer protocol is too minimal a change
to recognize as a derivative or collective work deserving copyright protection).
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The first significant series of cases examining the scope of a grant
of rights after the advent of a new technology questioned whether a
grant of dramatic rights included motion picture rights. The court de-
cisions were far from uniform and no clear pattern emerged. While
some courts held that a grant of dramatic rights (i.e., a right to what
are commonly thought of as live plays on stage) included motion pic-
86 8ture rights, others held that those rights were excluded.s7
Rooney v. Columbia Pictures,88 the first major case in recent times,
concerned the use of a new technology to record films or motion mov-
ing pictures on a videocassette recorder. This case involved the actor
Mickey Rooney.89 Rooney claimed that a group of film companies did
not have the right to use his pre-1960 movies in "alternative markets"--
"commercial television, pay television and audiovisual device mar-
kets."' The court quoted extensively from a lengthy series of contracts
and found that "it is difficult to conceive of contracts which more ex-
plicitly and certainly provide the answer to the major issue before this
Court .... These agreements make clear that the rights to exhibit Roo-
ney's pre-1960 films in the alternative markets are held by defendants
and not by Rooney." 9' The Rooney court found that "where ... a party
has acquired a contractual right which may fairly be read as extending
to media developed thereafter, the other party can hardly avoid the con-
tract's application to such media by establishing that the precise nature
of the advance was not anticipated."
The Ninth Circuit, in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,9' an-
nounced that, "[t]his case involves a novel issue of copyright law:
whether a license conferring the right to exhibit a film 'by means of
television' includes the right to distribute videocassettes of the film. We
hold it does not. ' 94 The central controversy was a right granted by Co-
hen in 1969 to use a musical composition in the movie Medium Cool.
The 1969 contract granted the licensee the "authority ... to record, in
86. See, e.g., Hart v. Fox, 166 N.Y.S. 793 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Lipzin v. Gordin, 166 N.Y.S.
792 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N.Y.S. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
87. See, e.g., Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920); Klein v. Beach, 232 F. Supp.
240 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd, 239 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1917); Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
88. Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 714
F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
89. See id.
90. Id. at 213.
91. Id. at 223.
92. Id. at 229.
93. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. Id. at 852.
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any manner, medium, form or language, the words and music of the mu-
sical composition... with ['Medium Cool']."95
Not only did the court find videocassette viewing of a markedly dif-
ferent nature not to be equated with exhibition by means of television,
but it also looked to the state of knowledge of the parties: "Perhaps the
primary reason why.., the license cannot be construed as including the
distribution of videocassettes for home viewing is that VCRs for home
use were not invented or known in 1969, when the license was exe-
cuted.' 96 In dictum, the court added that "the holder of the license
should not now 'reap the entire windfall' associated with the new me-
dium."97
In sum, courts have consistently acknowledged that the purpose of
U.S. copyright law is to stimulate the production of creative works in
order to get them before the public. The monopoly privileges that Con-
gress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision
of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 9s
Frequently, the actual analysis appears to be based upon the judge's
own view of technology, whether or not he is aware of its influence. A
judge's own view of the new technology will often influence the deter-
mination of whether he finds the new use included in the description of
the original grant of rights. In Rooney, the court found no significant
difference between television and videocassette and found the new use
included.99 Similarly, in Platinum Record Co., Inc. v. Lucasfllm, Ltd.,'00
the court equated home video and television and likewise found the new
use included in the original grant.
On the other hand, other courts have had a radically different view
of the same technology and have reached totally different results. The
court in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp. °1' found that "exhibition of
a film on television differs fundamentally from exhibition by means of a
95. Id. at 853.
96. Id. at 854.
97. Id. at 854.
98. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). "Monopoly" as used here
and elsewhere in copyright discussion refers to the temporary exclusive right granted to
possessors of a copyright.
99. See Rooney, 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.).
100. 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983).
101. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
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videocassette recorder"' and that "television and videocassette display
... have very little in common."' 3 Consequently, the court found the
new use not included in the grant. In these cases, what courts are really
being called upon to decide is whether the grantor or grantee should be
allowed to claim the benefits of the unanticipated windfall made possi-
ble by the invention of the new technology.
CONCLUSION
The development of case law in this area has been so scattered in its
formation that almost every time a new technology is invented, the
question arises whether that new use is included in a preexisting copy-
right license or contract. Historically, courts began struggling with this
problem when motion pictures were invented and licenses had been is-
sued for dramatic rights. Yet, despite revisions to the Copyright Act
since that time, courts are apparently continuing to face difficult choices
when resolving copyright license disputes involving the use of newly
developed technology.
As technological developments like the Internet continue to rapidly
expand the potential scope of intellectual property, courts will need to
be more vigilant in understanding technology and how technological
advances may dramatically affect the manner in which people receive
compensation for services they perform or products they produce."° In
addition, the law will need a more consistent framework to take on the
challenges that the rapid proliferation of new technology is guaranteed
to impose. More immediately, courts will need to make greater efforts
to ensure that state contract law does not have the unintended effect of
dislodging the important and fundamental principles supported by Fed-
eral copyright law.'05
More important, rather than leave all of these important issues for
courts to resolve, Congress must revise the Copyright Act to properly
guarantee that both fairness and predictability remain the basis for en-
suring that the basic purposes of American copyright law are furthered.
102. Id. at 853.
103. Id. at 854.
104. See generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(recapping history and basic technology of the Internet).
105. In this respect, courts applying state contract law principles to disputes concerning
copyright conveyances involving new or future technologies should assure themselves that
their construction of ambiguous contract language does not have the unintended effect of
implicitly disfavoring creators of original expression.
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One possible solution is a statutory provision setting forth the condi-
tions which warrant providing for royalties to the grantor. This could
satisfy the need for a framework that applies to developments of tech-
nologies heretofore unknown or unforeseeable by parties involved in
copyright transactions.
Given that one purpose of copyright is to make creative works
available to the public, it is imperative that it be economically worth-
while to all parties. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.," 6 the copyright law is intended to motivate
creativity and to allow public access to the products of that creativity. 1°7
Any viable solution must satisfy these twin objectives. Any threat of
closing down a potential future revenue stream can only be a disincen-
tive to all parties, grantors and grantees alike, in an already risky and
costly business, and it is the public which will ultimately be deprived of
new works. In this respect, Tasini does not serve the practical realities
of copyright.
Electronic media has profoundly and perhaps permanently changed
the conventional means by which information is distributed. These
changes have created a new bundle of rights whose ownership is uncer-
tain. Even in contracts drafted with great care, it is difficult to determine
whether new-use rights are meant to have been transferred or retained,
unless all rights are granted" 8 New-use rights cannot be defined with
precision at the time of contract, because, by defimition, they do not ex-
ist until some point after the agreement has been consummated. This
problem is only exacerbated in the publishing industry where crude
agreements, which until recently had been sufficient, are prevalent.
New-use rights are unlike other types of contractual rights because they
do not form any part of the mutual intent between contracting parties.
As a result, they represent a windfall in that neither party, without more
than the agreement, has a greater claim to those rights under current
law. Consequently, contract law is inadequate as a predictable frame-
work for resolution of Tasini disputes. Indeed, after Tasini, freelance
writers have little or no bargaining power over electronic rights when
faced with similar factual circumstances.' °9 Essentially, in a Tasini dis-
106. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
107. Id.
108. A grant of all rights would be unusual in a collective work.
109. This is clearly inconsistent with the copyright law's purpose of providing incen-
tives to authors of original works. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F.
Supp. 133, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd in relevant part and rev'd and remanded in part, 35
F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994). Whatever interest is sustained by protecting the collective
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pute, electronic rights are not even on the negotiating table for the typi-
cal freelance writer. While this result is clearly helpful for publishers, it
is not useful as a general framework that all parties can rely upon with
some degree of certainty. In negotiating various forms of digital rights,
reliance upon Tasini may prove unwarranted since, instead of relying
upon an analytical framework or broad principles of copyright law, the
Tasini opinion ultimately rests on its peculiar facts. It is unclear whether
a Tasini dispute should rightfully be resolved under Tasini if the dispute
involves publishing freelance articles on an Internet web site instead of
Lexis-Nexis or making the freelance articles available for downloading
(but not viewing) from an online service or the Internet."°
With regard to-computer databases, the existing law should have
aided the Tasini court, yet it did not."' When analyzed against the com-
plex backdrop of copyright law, the Tasini decision is not a satisfying
one. Often, when copyright infringement is alleged, courts must balance
the competing aims of promoting human creativity and original expres-
sion through strict enforcement of the copyright law and ensuring that
broad copyright protections do not unfairly or unnecessarily prevent the
development of our knowledge-base (including the development of
practical uses of technology and information). This kind of balancing,
however, does not seem evident in the analysis in Tasini. By favoring
the rights of publishers, the Tasini court subverted the constitutional aim
of promoting human creativity and original expression."2 The decision
essentially exalted revision over original expression.
Tasini is significant because, if allowed to stand as the law of copy-
right, it could have an extraordinary effect on Cyberspace and
multimedia entertainment. By any measure, the impact of the explosive
growth of Cyberspace is difficult to exaggerate."' Online databases,
works of authors of revisions, that interest should not be read so broadly as to undercut the
interest protected by copyright of an author's original work.
110. The argument here is not that Tasini cannot be applied to other cases. The sweep-
ing language by the court certainly presumes that this is so. Rather, the point is that the
court's failure to rely upon an analytical framework means that parties will rely upon Tasini
at great peril if the facts under negotiation depart even slightly from Tasini's peculiar facts.
11. See, e.g., David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, The Information Infrastructure,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1994, at 3.
112. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the fact that if authors are not granted
copyright protection, they would find it difficult to earn a living and would be forced to
divert their energies elsewhere).
113. There are people who believe that the computer revolution of this decade repre-
sents a fundamental change in American society, one that will rank alongside the great social
movements in history. "This [will be] mainstream culture of the 21st century," says Louis
Rossetto, founder of Wired magazine and its cyberspace counterpart, Hotwired. "It's a new
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multimedia technologies, and online entertainment-based interactive
software applications are proliferating. Often, these new digital products
contain works that were formerly part of another collective work in
print or some other non-electronic form. After Tasini, freelance authors
may be lawfully uncompensated by the publishers of digital content
who revise the collective work containing the freelance author's original
creation. This result could inevitably frustrate future convergence of
pre-existing print content with a digital counterpart.11 4 Copyright should
not affect relations between producers of content and the writers, artists,
computer programmers, and others who actually create the content or
elements of collective works by stripping away any copyright interest
held by a freelancer in a digital product produced by revising the preex-
isting version of the collective work. Will producers and publishers of
content take advantage of the black hole provided by Tasini and freely
port the print works of others to digital format in Cyberspace? If so,
what repercussions may follow, and is this the direction or trend we
want to support?"5 The potential answers to these questions demonstrate
why the Tasini court should have found that a publisher's production of
an online or CD-ROM-based computer database using an author's
original works constitutes copyright infringement by the publisher under
the law of copyright.
economy, a new counterculture, and beyond politics. In 10 or 20 years, the world will be
completely transformed. Everything we know will be different." Paul Keegan, The Digerati!,
N.Y. TIMS MAG., May 21, 1995, at 38.
114. See generally Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure,
Executive Summary of Preliminary Draft of Report By Working Group On Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, DAILY RP. FOR EXECUtMVES (BNA) Section M, at 69 (July 8, 1994) ("What will
drive the success of the NII is the content moving through it. Therefore, the potential of the
NIL will not be realized if the content is not protected effectively. Owners of intellectual
property rights will not be willing to put their interests at risk.").
115. See American Geophysical Union, 802 F. Supp. at 17 (noting that the Supreme
Court acknowledged that reproduction of entire work ordinarily "'militat[es] against a find-
ing of fair use' ") (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984)).
